We analyze a model where an altruistic sender, who may or may not be informed, broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but this equilibrium is not necessarily unique nor symmetric. If the sender is overconfident, he tends to exaggerate, and in equilibrium extreme messages are sent more frequently. While overconfidence reduces informativeness in some cases, it may also eliminate less informative equilibria. We also show that overconfidence can improve informativeness when broadcasting is costly.
Introduction
Until a few years ago it would have been very costly for an individual to communicate his views about a product or a service to a large number of people. This has changed dramatically. With the development of the internet, millions of individuals can now broadcast their opinion at a cost that is essentially equal only to the time it takes to produce the message. This cost can be quite small if the sender only checks off a rating number and possibly adds a sentence or two supporting his view. Consider, as an example, readers' book reviews on the Amazon.com web site. This site allows readers to assign a rating between one and five stars to any book. Figure 1 shows the frequency at which stars are awarded in a random sampling of Amazon.com ratings of non-fiction books. Note that the distribution of ratings is far from uniform and is heavily skewed toward the five star ranking. One is led to wonder how this significant deviation from a uniform distribution comes about, and why some ratings (e.g. two stars) are hardly used. Does this mean that little information is being communicated This is based on the empirical distribution of the number of stars awarded to nonfiction books written by authors with the ten most common last names in the USA (Smith, Johnson, etc.) . Only books that had at least one review were included, and the number of stars awarded in the most recent review was recorded for each book. This resulted in a total of 662 observations. through these ratings? In this paper we attempt to shed some light on such questions by analyzing information tranmission through a finite number of messages. Our basic assumptions are that those who broadcast messages truly want to inform others and that the receivers of these messages are adept at interpreting the information content in the messages they observe. We are particularly interested in determining how much information is communicated in equilibrium and asking under what conditions the equilibrium will be informationally efficient in the sense that the most information is communicated given the set of available messages.
Our model includes an agent we refer to as a sender, who transmits to an audience of receivers information concerning the value of a random variable of interest to receivers. Since so much is broadcasted on the internet and since people pay attention to the broadcasted messages, it seems reasonable to assume, as we do, that these messages do contain useful information. However, given the ease of broadcasting and the relative anonymity of senders, it is likely that information transmission of this sort is quite noisy in the sense that some messages may contain little or no information. To capture the noise in the transmission process we assume that there is a probability that the sender's signal is uninformative (statistically independent of the variable receivers are trying to assess).
An important issue regarding information transmission of the sort we analyze concerns the sender's motives in broadcasting the information. As already mentioned, we will assume that the sender's preferences are altruistic, i.e., that he wants to communicate the information he has so that others will benefit, and this means that he would like receivers' assessments given his message to be as close as possible to his own assessment.
The information transmission that we model is also characterized by its non-repeated and anonymous nature. Unlike an expert such as a weather or economic forecaster or a stock analyst, the sender in our model does not interact repeatedly with the receivers of the information, and there is no implicit or explicit contract between the sender and the receivers. Thus, the sender is not involved in reputation building. This is appropriate for Various interpretations can be given to the random variable that agents in the model are trying to predict. It can be, for example, the common value of a product such as a stock certificate, a book, an electronic appliance or the quality of shipping and handling by a seller in internet auctions.
Similar preferences have been assumed in some models in political economics, e.g., Piketty (2000) . It is of course possible that some senders transmitting information on the internet, e.g., employees of a company producing a product or a competing product, friends and relatives of a book's author, etc., have an agenda or a bias. To the extent that biased senders or those with specific agenda "cancel each other out" statistically, they can be thought of as part of the noisy or uninformed type of sender in our model.
For models of repeated interaction in the context of information disclosure, where modeling information transmission over the internet, where the sender is often unknown to receivers and little (and non-verifiable) information is given about his identity, expertise, etc.
Our model assumes that the receivers of the broadcasted message have rational expectations and make the correct inference from the information they observe. This is a reasonable assumption if receivers have the opportunity to learn over time the statistical relation between broadcasted messages and actual values. While there are good reasons to assume that the receivers become skillful in interpreting the information in broadcast messages correctly, there is less reason to assume that senders are also rational in interpreting the information in their signals. There is indeed substantial empirical evidence supporting the notion that people are overconfident, especially when it comes to assessing the precision of their own information. We therefore analyze both a benchmark case where the sender is rational and interprets his signal correctly, and a model in which the sender is overconfident, believing that his signal is informative while, in fact, there is a positive probability that it is not.
When all agents are rational, we show that there is an equilibrium outcome that is informationally efficient in the sense that it minimizes the mean squared error of receivers' assessments over all the information transmission strategies available to the sender. However, there are generally other equilibrium outcomes, which are less informative. Furthermore, even though we assume that all underlying distributions are symmetric, we show that, in general, neither the informationally efficient way to transmit information nor the equilibrium outcome of the model necessarily result in a symmetric distribution for the broadcasted messages. We present examples in which multiple equilibria, including asymmetric equilibria, exist, and in which asymmetric equilibria are more informative than symmetric equilibria. Some of the asymmetric equilibria involve significantly difreputation issues often arise, see, for example, Ehrbeck and Waldman (1996) , Ottaviani and Sorensen (1999) , Prendergast and Stole (1996) , Sobel (1985) , and Stocken (2000) .
Attempts have been made recently to improve the information receivers have about information providers and about the quality of their information. Sometimes the receiver is directed to other reviews by the same person and information is also tallied about whether other receivers have found the review useful. Modeling this is beyond the scope of this paper.
Note that this assumes that the messages that receivers observe over time originate from senders who are behaving in similar ways and sending messages in statistically similar settings, so that receivers can indeed learn the correct statistical relations between messages and the true value.
For a summary of evidence on this as well as for models of financial markets with overconfident investors see, for example, Odean (1998), and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) . ferent likelihoods for each of the available messages, which is consistent with the data presented in Figure 1 .
When the sender is overconfident, we show that he will have a tendency to exaggerate, and equilibrium typically involves a higher incidence of more extreme messages. In general, equilibria in this case are less informative. However, we show that it is possible that the equilibrium with overconfident senders is more informative than some of the equilibria that arise if senders are rational. This is due to the general phenomenon that the number of equilibria in the model with an overconfident sender is smaller than the number of equilibria in the model with a rational sender.
The first part of our analysis will be conducted under the assumption that the cost of broadcasting a message is zero. This approximates a situation in which the cost is extremely low relative to the perceived benefit of broadcasting to the sender. When the cost of broadcasting is significant, the analysis changes in that the benefit of broadcasting as perceived by the sender must now be large enough to offset its cost. The equilibria we obtain in this case involve a set of sender types who remain silent and do not broadcast a message. Receivers, being rational, make the correct inference when observing that no message has been broadcasted, just as they do when observing a broadcasted message. We show that when broadcasting is costly, the equilibrium with an overconfident sender can actually be more informative than the equilibrium that arises with a rational sender, because an overconfident sender is more likely than a rational sender to bear the cost of broadcasting. Also, when the sender is overconfident the equilibrium outcome can be more informative when broadcasting is costly than when it is costless, because the cost might mitigate the exaggeration phenomenon discussed above.
The basic structure of our model is similar to that discussed in the literature on strategic information transmission, e.g., Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Ottaviani and Sorensen (1999) . However, the focus of our analysis and many of our specific assumptions (especially with regard to agents' preferences) are different. The papers mentioned above derive results showing that coarse information transmission, where the number of messages being sent in equilibrium is significantly smaller than the set of possible signal realizations, emerge in equilibrium. In our model, consistent with the way information is transmitted over the internet, we assume coarse information transmission by taking the number of available messages to be finite while the message space is a continuum. Moreover, if all agents in our model are rational, then our model does not involve the type of conflict or inconsistency of preferences that is central to models in this literature, and so the results do not apply. These papers also do not consider behavioral assumptions such as overconfidence, which is an important focus of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. We introduce the basic model in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes the equilibrium under the assumption that all agents are rational and compares the equilibrium outcomes with those that are efficient in the sense that they minimize the mean squared error over all possible ways for senders to communicate information using the set of given messages. In Section 4 we analyze the case in which the sender is overconfident. Section 5 considers the model with costly broadcasting. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 6.
The Basic Model and Some Preliminary Results
In our model a sender broadcasts a report concerning the unknown value of a random variable a Y. We assume that a Y has a continuous distribution on a finite interval. To simplify the discussion (without affecting the results in any significant way), we assume that the density of a Y is positive, except possibly on a set of measure zero, and that the support of a Y is >b @. We also assume, without loss of generality, that the expected value of a Y is zero. For some of our results and examples we will make more specific assumptions concerning the distribution of a Y. In particular, in all of our examples a Y will have a symmetric distribution, and some of our results and examples will apply to the case where a Y has a uniform distribution.
The sender observes a signal a V, and forms an assessment of the value of a Y based on the realization of the signal. With probability w ! , the signal a V is perfectly informative and equal to the realization of a Y, and with probability b w, it is uninformative (a V is statistically independent of a Y) and represents pure noise. We assume that the distribution of a V when it is uninformative is identical to that of the true value a Y. Thus, the conditional expectation of a Y given a realization V of a V is wV. The sender's assessment of the value of a Y given the signal is denoted by ( 6 a V. We will analyze the model under two different assumptions about how the sender forms his assessments ( 6 V given his signal. One
Issues concerning the implications of strategic and non-strategic disclosure of information arise also is models of political economy, where candidates, legislators and voters communicate through hearings, debates, and elections. (See, for example, Austen-Smith (1990), Banks (1990) , Banerjee and Somanathan (2001), and Piketty (2000) .) Here conflicts and differing agendas are obviously important, which again is different from the situation we model.
With probability w the signal is equal to a Y, and with probability b w the expected value of a Y given the signal is zero, since a V is independent of a Y and the expected value of a Y is zero.
case is where the sender is rational, and ( 6 V wV, and the other is where the sender is overconfident, in which case he believes that w and ( 6 V V.
We assume that there are . possible messages that the sender can broadcast. For example, there might be a ranking between 1 and 10 or a choice of the number of stars to award a product or a service. The messages available to senders are indexed by M c c c .. We assume for now that broadcasting is costless to the sender. Note that the above formulation implicitly assumes that the sender must broadcast one of the . available messages. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the sender is able to choose not to broadcast any message, i.e., to remain silent. As long as broadcasting is costless, this involves a simple reinterpretation of our model: one of the . available messages can be interpreted as the action of remaining silent. When we analyze, in section 5, the case in which broadcasting is costly, we will have to distinguish between the . b "real" messages that involve costly broadcasting and the costless act of remaining silent, and we will find that making broadcasting costly changes some of our results.
The sender's message is observed by agents we refer to as "receivers." Receivers are uninformed and use the sender's message to update their prior beliefs concerning the value of a Y. Our key assumptions are that (i) the sender understands how receivers will respond to his message, and (ii) the sender's objective is to cause the updated assessment of a Y by the receivers to be as close as possible to the sender's own assessment ( 6 V.We denote by ( 5 M the value of a Y as assessed by receivers after observing message M. More precisely, (
5 M is what the sender believes will be the receivers' assessed value of a Y upon observing message M, which we assume is indeed equal to the receivers' assessment.
A strategy for the sender is a function 0 >b @ I c c c .J mapping signal realizations to messages. Given the above assumptions, if the sender observes a realization V of the signal, he will send message 0V only if
We assume throughout our analysis that receivers have rational expectations: they make the correct inference from the broadcasted message, so that for every given strategy of the sender, ( 5 M is the conditional expectation of a Y given that message M has been broadcasted, i.e., given that 0 a V M. This can be motivated by a envisioning that
Note that the sender in our model always observes a signal. If there is a possibility that the sender does not observe any signal, and if a sender who does not observe a signal remains silent, then less information will obviously be conveyed by the action of remaining silent. This will tend to eliminate equilibria in which the set of senders who remain silent includes those with extreme signal realizations.
receivers learn from experience the joint distribution of a Y and the broadcasted message. Note that this implies that ( 5 M >bw w@.
Definition:
An equilibrium consists of a strategy 0c such that condition (1) is satisfied and such that receivers' assessments upon observing the message, ( 5 0c, are rational given the sender's strategy 0c.
One can immediately see that, independent of the specific assumptions made about ( 6 c, there are many equilibria in our model. For example, consider partitioning the interval > @ into . subintervals and let 0 V M if the absolute value of V is in the Mth interval of the partition. Then, for each message the set of sender types broadcasting the message is symmetric around zero. Thus, for every M c c c ., we have ( 5 M , and no information is transmitted by any message. We will focus our analysis on equilibria in which this cannot occur, as different messages lead to distinct assessments by receivers. We will call these expressive equilibria.
Definition: An equilibrium is expressive if for every M O we have ( 5 M ( Clearly, since there are . possible messages that the sender can transmit, there can be at most . distinct assessments made by receivers after they observe the sender's message. In an expressive equilibrium there are in fact . distinct assessments made by receivers in response to the sender's messages. Without loss of generality we order the messages according to the order of these assessments, so that the lowest message, message 1, is associated with the lowest assessment, while message . is associated with the highest assessment.
For reasons that will become clear shortly, our analysis will focus on strategies with a particularly simple structure, which we now define.
A strategy for the sender is monotone if it can be described by a partition of the interval >b @ into . subintervals defined by the cutoff points
Expressive equilibria essentially are those where the richness of the available message space is utilized to the extent that as many distinct assessments are generated as the number of messages available to convey information. Although it is often the case that expressive equilibria are more informative than equilibria that are not expressive, we will see in Section 5 examples in which, at least with costly broadcasting, certain equilibria that are not expressive by the definition given here are more informative than the unique expressive equilibrium that exists for these parameters.
The following result implies that in analyzing expressive equilibria we only need to consider monotone strategies. The proof of this and subsequent results is in the appendix.
Lemma 1:
In any expressive equilibrium the sender is using a monotone strategy.
In our equilibrium analysis we will be interested in how much information is communicated in equilibrium. An important benchmark in this discussion is what we will call the informationally efficient strategies, which represent efficient ways to communicate the sender's information to the receivers using the . available messages.
Definition: A broadcasting strategy using at most . messages is informationally efficient if it minimizes the mean squared error of receivers in predicting a Y over all possible broadcasting strategies that use . messages, i.e., it minimizes (a Y b ( 5 0c over all strategies 0 >b @ I c c c .J.
The following result establishes that, at least up to a set of measure zero, informationally efficient strategies are monotone. Moreover, in our model the set of monotone and informationally efficient strategies (which is essentially the entire set of informationally efficient strategies) is independent of w. The first part of this result is quite intuitive and is robust to specific distributional assumptions. Given that all informationally efficient strategies are monotone except possibly for a set of measure zero, we will only analyze informationally efficient strategies that are monotone. Note that the set of informationally efficient and monotone strategies is non-empty. This follows because these strategies are defined by . b interior cutoff
The assumption that 0[ M M is a tie-breaking assumption that does not affect our results. In equilibrium for M . the sender types such that V [ M will be indifferent between message M and message M . Moreover, since a V and a Y have continuous distributions, the analysis does not change if any of these types sends message M instead of message M. For the rest of the paper we will only refer to open interval when defining a strategy, with the understanding that the upper endpoint is included (and V b is also included in the first interval). points, chosen from the compact interval >b @, to minimize the mean squared error, which is a continuous function given our assumptions. Part (ii) of the proposition does depend on our distributional assumptions, which imply that the conditional expectation of a Y given a V is linear in a V (and in w)
.
We now proceed to analyze the equilibria of the model under various assumptions regarding the sender's assessment.
The Case of a Rational Sender
We start our analysis of the model by assuming that both the sender and the receivers are rational, i.e., all know the true joint distribution of a Y and a V and have rational expectations. Thus, all agents know that the sender's signal is perfectly informative with probability w and uninformative with probability b w. This implies (since the sender does not know whether the signal is informative or not), that ( 6 V wV. If the sender with signal V sends message 0V, then It is useful to define for any interval defined by the endpoints D and E.
V D E the probability that the sender is informed is w u Thus, if the sender is using a monotone strategy defined by the interior cutoff points
For such a strategy to be an expressive equilibrium it must be that if
That is, if the sender's signal realization V falls in the M'th interval, then the sender prefers to send message M rather than sending any other message
, V is equal to one of the interior cutoff points, the sender must be indifferent between sending message M and sending message M . Thus, in an expressive equilibrium with cutoff points [ M we must have
It is easy to see that for a monotone strategy, (4) is sufficient for an equilibrium (i.e., (3) implies (4)). Also, given our assumptions about the joint distribution of a V and a Y,
It follows that w cancels out in equation (4). Thus, we have
Observation:
The set of expressive equilibria represented is independent of w.
Recall that Proposition 1 states that the set of informationally efficient strategies is also independent of w. As we show in the next result, informational efficiency can in fact be obtained by an expressive equilibrium. Since the set of informationally efficient strategies is non-empty, this implies that an expressive equilibrium always exits in our model.
Proposition 2: There exists an expressive equilibrium that is informationally efficient. Moreover, any informationally efficient strategy is an expressive equilibrium.
We now analyze some examples of our model. First, suppose a Y is uniformly distributed over the interval >b @. Then it is easy to show that the only informationally efficient strategy is symmetric and involves dividing the interval >b @ to . subintervals of equal length. To see this, assume that the Mth message is sent when the sender's signal lies in the interval
, that all subintervals in the partition have equal length. This is also the unique expressive equilibrium in this case. It turns out that even if we assume that the distribution of a Y (and a V) is symmetric around zero, neither uniqueness nor the symmetry of the expressive equilibrium and of the informationally efficient strategy hold in general.
To illustrate some of these phenomena, consider the following example. Suppose the density of a Y is given by I Y MYM , . and w . The set of expressive Note that both sides of (4) are non-negative, because
Since the expressive equilibrium and the informationally efficient partitions do not depend on w and since conditional expectations are simply multiplied by w, the results for w can be easily inferred from our discussion. equilibria, including receivers' assessment given each message in each equilibrium, is summarized in Figure 2 . In this example there are three expressive equilibria, one whose cutoff points are symmetric around zero and two whose cutoff points are not symmetric around zero. One of the asymmetric expressive equilibria is given in Figure 2 , and the other is the mirror image of this one. Note that, although the distribution of a Y is symmetric, the mean squared error in the asymmetric equilibria is lower than that in the symmetric equilibrium. That is, the asymmetric equilibria are more informative than the symmetric equilibrium. Since from Proposition 2 we know that one of the expressive equilibria is informationally efficient, it follows that in this example the asymmetric equilibria are informationally efficient. That is, the most effective way to communicate the sender's information in this example is through an asymmetric partition of the sender types.
To understand this seemingly counter-intuitive result, note that the distribution of a Y in this case is concentrated on the two tails, and there is little mass in the center of the distribution, around zero. It is useful to consider an extreme version of this type of distribution, in which there is almost no mass in the center of the distribution at all.
For example, suppose that IY q if MYM and a Y is uniformly distributed over the two intervals >b b@ and > @, with equal weight on each interval. If . , an expressive equilibrium is defined by two cutoff points. It is easy to see that as q converges to zero, the only symmetric expressive equilibrium is given by the cutoff points b and . The assessments made given the three signals are, respectively, b . As q vanishes, the second message is not sent, and effectively the receiver only learns whether a Y falls in the positive or the negative part of the distribution. Thus, the informational content of this equilibrium is the same as we would obtain if . and the single cutoff point were zero; there are only two relevant equilibrium messages. For the case . , however, there are two other expressive equilibria, and in both of them more information is transmitted. One is defined (as q vanishes) by the cutoff points b and , the other is a mirror image of it, defined by cutoff points b and . In the first of these equilibria, receivers' equilibrium assessments given the three respective messages are given by b, and . Note that here all messages are informative: while the first message still leads to the assessment that a Y is negative, both second and third message provides strictly more information than they do in the symmetric equilibrium by dividing the interval > @ to two subinterval. It follows that the asymmetric equilibria are more informative than the symmetric equilibrium.
While the intuition above applies to cases where the distribution of a Y has significant mass at the extremes and relatively little mass at the center, it turns out that multiple expressive equilibria and situations where asymmetric equilibria are informationally efficient arise for other types of distributions. For example, suppose that the distribution of a Y is given by I Y if MYM ! or MYM , and IY otherwise, and let . . Then it can be shown that there are three expressive equilibria. One is symmetric with a cutoff of zero, and two are asymmetric. One asymmetric equilibrium has cutoff point and the other, which is a mirror image, has a cutoff point b. The mean squared error associated with the symmetric equilibrium is 0.161 and that associated with the asymmetric equilibria is , which is smaller. The intuition in this case is that since the center "spike" is very narrow, the loss associated with not providing information For Y , the sender is indifferent between sending the second message, leading to an assessment of zero (since it is sent by senders with signals in the interval b @ and the third message (sent by the interval @ and leading to the assessment x . The same considerations apply for Y b. Note that there does not exist a symmetric expressive equilibrium in which the cutoff points are within the intervals >b b@ and > @, because, for example, ( 5 b, while ( 5 , and it is not possible that a sender with signal in the interval > @ is indifferent between these. about the center of the distribution is less significant than the gain obtained by isolating the types at one extreme side of the distribution.
It is interesting to examine the probability distribution induced in equilibrium for the observed messages in the example of Figure 2 . Clearly, in the symmetric equilibrium, this distribution is symmetric. However, the distribution is not uniform and not all messages are sent with equal probability. It can be shown, in fact, that in the symmetric equilibrium messages 1 and 5 are sent with probability of about each, while message 3 is sent with probability of about . Although the cutoff points and the equilibrium inferences are quite different in the asymmetric equilibria, the probability distribution of broadcasted messages is not significantly different in this example. Thus, in this example we obtain a non-uniform distribution of observed messages, but not a highly asymmetric one. In the next section we will see an example where, even with a rational sender, the distribution of observed messages is highly asymmetric.
The Case of an Overconfident Sender
We now assume that, while receivers have rational expectations and make the correct statistical inference from the message they observe, the sender is overconfident and believes that his signal is always informative (w ). An interpretation of this is that there are two types of sender. One type is informed and rational (i.e., believes correctly that w ), the other type is actually uninformed but is overconfident and believes that he is informed.
We will be studying again the set of expressive equilibria of the model. Recall that an expressive equilibrium using . messages is defined by . b interior cutoff points
sender sends message M. The equilibrium condition is similar to (3) and given by
More generally, the sender may believe that w is larger than it actually is. We only analyze the case in which the sender assumes w . Our results also apply if the sender is actually informed and rational (i.e., the true value of w is one) but receivers, who are unjustifiably skeptical, underestimate w and believe it is strictly less than 1. In this case, however, the actual mean squared error is smaller than that assessed by receivers.
While for any two numbers D E and for any w , wD xD E w, if w then it is not always the case that D xD E w. However, it is easy to see that if D and The expressive equilibrium cutoff when a Y is uniformly distributed, . and the sender is overconfident as a function of w, the probability that the sender is informed.
Let us start with the case in which a Y is distributed uniformly over the interval >b @. Given the receivers have rational expectations, we know that
And, for the sender we have ( 6 V V. Thus, the equilibrium conditions (8) can be written as
E are cutoff points in an expressive equilibrium then this inequality must hold. This is discussed in more details in Section 5.
It is easy to see that with the boundary conditions [ b and [ . the above system of equations has a unique solution. Note that when w , this model coincides with the model of Section 3, where all agents are rational. If w , however, the expressive equilibrium conditions (8) are not the same as those in Section 3 (equation (4)). Figure 3 shows the expressive equilibrium partitions for the case . as w varies. For w , the equilibrium partition divides the interval >b @ to ten equal subintervals, each with length 0.2 (and probability ). Note that the unique expressive equilibrium is always symmetric and zero is always the middle cutoff point [ . As w decreases, we see that the interior cutoff points get closer to zero and to each other. In other words, messages in the middle of the message space get sent less frequently (i.e., by very small intervals of signal realizations). This is an "exaggeration" phenomenonas w decreases the sets of sender types sending extreme messages (those sent by types with extreme realizations) grow while the sets of types sending "average" messages (those sent by types at the center of the distribution) shrink. Intuitively, the sender attempts to overcome the impact of the noise by pooling with more extreme types. This becomes more pronounced as w approaches zero. For very small values of w, only the two extreme messages (1 and 10) are effectively being sent in equilibrium -If the signal is positive, the highest message is sent, and if it is negative, the lowest message is sent. In all cases with w , however, the further a message is from the "middle" messages (those sent by sender types close to zero, i.e., messages 5 and 6), the more likely it is to be broadcasted.
The expressive equilibrium partitions in the above example are clearly different from the informationally efficient partition, which divides the interval to equally spaced subintervals. Thus, with overconfidence Proposition 2 does not hold and informational efficiency is not generally obtained in an expressive equilibrium. It is easy to see that, at least for the case where a Y has a uniform distribution, the informativeness of the expressive equilibrium is increasing in the number of possible messages .. This is true both when the sender is rational and when the sender is overconfident.
The case of uniform distributions is simple, since both the expressive equilibrium and the informationally efficient strategy are unique and symmetric. As we saw in the previous section, other distributions might produce very different results. Indeed, multiple expressive equilibria are possible. Interestingly, keeping w constant, overconfidence generally reduces the number of expressive equilibria. The next proposition establishes the existence of an expressive equilibrium when the sender is overconfident and shows that for small enough values of w the equilibrium is unique. equilibrium is unique and symmetric.
We saw that when a Y has a uniform distribution, overconfidence always leads to a decrease in the informativeness of the expressive equilibrium. The next example, illustrated in Figure 4 , shows that the expressive equilibrium obtained with an overconfident sender is more informative than some of the expressive equilibria in the case where the sender is rational.
In this example the density of a Y is given by I Y Y , w , and . . If the sender is rational, then there are five expressive equilibria; three of these are described in Figure 4 and two additional ones are mirror images of the two asymmetric equilibria.
Note that the symmetric equilibrium is the one with the lowest mean squared error among the equilibria (and therefore, by Proposition 2, it is informationally efficient). If the sender is overconfident, then it can be shown that in this example there is a unique expressive equilibrium, which is symmetric. This equilibrium is also described in Figure 4 . Note that this equilibrium is more informative than the asymmetric equilibria of the case of a rational sender. Thus, in this example overconfidence can lead to an increase in the informativeness of the equilibrium. This occurs because with an overconfident sender asymmetric strategies, which are less informative in this case) are no longer expressive equilibria when the sender is overconfident.
It is interesting to note that in this example the asymmetric expressive equilibria of the rational sender case induce a highly asymmetric distribution for the observed messages. Consider the first asymmetric equilibrium (labeled "Asymmetric 1" in the figure) . It can be shown that in this equilibrium the highest message is broadcasted with probability , while the lowest is broadcasted with probability . This is broadly consistent with the phenomenon of asymmetry illustrated in Figure 1 .
Equilibrium Analysis with Costly Broadcasting
We have assumed in the analysis so far that broadcasting is costless to the sender. Although the cost of broadcasting over the internet, for example, is very small, for many senders it is not zero, and may be significant relative to the perceived benefit of broadcasting to the sender. In this section we will analyze equilibria of our model when there is a fixed cost F associated with sending a message. This cost is normalized to be measured in the same units as the prediction error made by receivers given the observed message relative to the sender's assessment. Thus, the sender chooses his action (namely, whether to remain silent and, if he broadcasts a message, which message to broadcast) to minimize the sum of the receivers' prediction error and the cost of broadcasting.
A sender who does not broadcast a message because it is not worth the cost of broadcasting potentially reveals information to receivers through his silence. Accordingly, Not surprisingly, of course, the mean squared error in the equilibrium with an overconfident sender is higher than that obtained in the symmetric equilibrium for the case where the sender is rational, which is informationally efficient.
We have not parameterized this example with the intention of replicating the distribution in Figure 1 , although we are confident that this can be done. As discussed in the concluding remarks, while our model can produce the general phenomena of asymmetry and non-uniformity of the distribution of observed messages, it is likely that other elements, not present in our model, affect the actual distributions we observe. in our analysis we interpret . as the total number of actions that the sender can take, including remaining silent, and receivers update their assessments on the basis of the action chosen by the sender from the . available ones.
The fact that broadcasting is costly, while remaining silent is costless, changes the equilibrium analysis. Broadcasting will occur in equilibrium only if the benefit of doing so outweighs the cost. One of the new phenomena that arise with costly broadcasting is that for a given . there might not exist expressive equilibria. This is clearly true if the cost of broadcasting is too high. In this case the only equilibrium is that all sender types remain silent and no message is broadcasted.
Throughout this section we will maintain the simplifying assumption that the distributions of a Y and a V are uniform. This will allow us to focus on the impact of costly broadcasting without dealing with some of the other issues that arise with non-uniform distributions. Recall that with uniform distributions, if broadcasting is costless, then the unique informationally efficient partition, which is also the unique expressive equilibrium when the sender is rational, involves a partition of the interval >b @ into . subintervals with equal length, where . is the number of possible actions the sender can choose from. Now suppose that there is a cost F ! associated with broadcasting a message. Consider first the case where the sender, like the receivers, is rational. In this case the set of expressive equilibria of the model with costly broadcasting is characterized as follows.
c c c . b , one of which represents sender types who remain silent while others represent distinct sender types who broadcast one of the . b actual messages and incur the cost F. The length of the "silent" interval is longer than that of the intervals representing costly broadcasting. To see intuitively why this must be the case, assume for simplicity that w , and suppose that there are two adjacent intervals, D E and E F with D E F, which are of equal length and such that sender types with V D E are silent while sender types with V E F broadcast message M at a cost F w. Then receivers' assessment upon observing silence is given by D E , while receivers' assessment upon observing message M is E F . Now consider the sender's choice of action if V E. The sender can remain silent, in which case the distance between his assessment and that made by receivers is E b D E E b D . Alternatively, the sender can broadcast message M, incurring cost F ! and causing the same difference in assessment to arise. (Since the intervals have equal length, E b D F b E.) Clearly, it is impossible for the sender to be indifferent between these actions, and thus the length of the "silent" interval must be longer than the length of the interval of types adjacent to it who are broadcasting a costly message in equilibrium. The sender who is indifferent between remaining silent and broadcasting a message has an assessment that is closer to that made by receivers if he broadcasts a message than that made by receivers if he remains silent. The cost makes him indifferent between the two actions.
It turns out, not surprisingly, that in all the equilibria in this case the length of the intervals is the same, only their location changes. Of course, such equilibria exist only if the cost of broadcasting is not too high. Otherwise, no costly broadcasting occurs in any equilibrium. This is summarized in the following result. The above result is illustrated in Figure 5 . For . and w , this figure shows the symmetric expressive equilibrium partitions as the cost of broadcasting a message increases from zero to . In the symmetric equilibria the sender types close to zero remain silent, while senders whose signals are more extreme broadcast one of two available messages at a cost. The grey area represents the interval of sender types that remain silent. (We order the messages according to the inference made by receivers. Thus, message is broadcasted at a cost by the lowest sender types, message is identified with silence, and message is broadcasted at a cost by the highest sender types.) As we already observed in Section 3, if broadcasting is costless, then the expressive equilibrium partition divides the interval >b @ to equal-length subintervals, so that the interior cutoff points are b and . As the cost increases, the interval of silent sender types widens. For example, consider the point where F . In this case, it turns out that the symmetric equilibrium has cutoff points b and , and the probability that the sender remains quiet is 2/3 instead of 1/3 when broadcasting is costless.
To see why this is an equilibrium, consider the sender who receives the signal V , which is at the boundary point. This sender type has the rational assessment ( 6 w . The sender in this case has the following choices in equilibrium: first, he can broadcast message 3 at a cost of 0.25, leading receivers to believe that his signal is in the interval . The prediction error receivers will make figure. ) Given that the cost of broadcasting is , the total cost to the sender is . An alternative for the sender is to remain silent. In this case receivers believe that the sender type is in the interval b , and their assessment is zero, leading to a prediction error of . Thus, the sender with V is indifferent between broadcasting message 3 at a cost of and remaining silent. It is easy to see that in this example and with F , all sender types with MVM ! strictly prefer to broadcast a message at a cost. (Those with negative signal realizations in this range broadcast message 1 and those with positive realizations broadcast message 3.) All sender types with MVM strictly prefer to remain silent.
The case where the sender is overconfident, in which receivers realize that w but the sender behaves as if w , can lead to very different results from those obtained with a rational sender. We have seen in the previous section that with costless broadcasting, overconfidence leads to an exaggeration phenomenon whereby the expressive equilibrium partition has longer intervals further from zero. In Figure 6 we describe the symmetric expressive equilibrium cutoffs with costly broadcasting assuming again that . and w . Again, the grey area represents the interval of sender types that remains silent. Consider first the case F , and recall that the cutoff points for the symmetric expressive equilibrium in the case of a rational sender (in Figure 5) are b . Not surprisingly, since this interval is at the center of the distribution, when the sender is overconfident the interval of types that remain silent is smaller. In fact, for this case the expressive equilibrium has senders with V b remaining silent, while those with realizations further from zero are broadcasting one of the two messages depending on the sign of their signal. Consider the sender whose signal is V . In equilibrium this sender is indifferent between broadcasting message 3 and remaining silent, because he assesses the error made by receivers if he remains silent as 2/7 (the distance between 2/7 and zero), while if he broadcasts a message that communicates his signal is higher, he views the error as b , and plus the cost of broadcasting ( ) is equal to . Again, it is easy to see that except at the cutoff points, all other sender types strictly prefer the action they choose in equilibrium to any other action.
In our analysis so far it was always the case that if [ M is an interior cutoff in an expressive equilibrium (so that a sender with V [ M is indifferent between sending message M and sending message M ), then
That is, if in an expressive equilibrium a sender is indifferent between sending two messages, then his assessment of a Y given his signal is bracketed by the two (different) assessments that receivers form upon receiving the two messages. As we will see below, this need not be true if broadcasting is costly and the sender is overconfident. Specifically, for some parameters it will turn out that a sender is indifferent between broadcasting a particular message and remaining silent, and at the same time the sender's assessment of a Y is strictly larger than receivers' overconfident assessment upon observing either silence or that message.
To understand how this can arise note first that for every three numbers D, E, and F such that b D E F , and for every w , it must be that
is the true conditional expectation of a Y given that V D E and V is informative with probability w. That is, the true conditional expectation of a Y given that V E is bracketed by the conditional expectation of a Y given that a V D E and the conditional expectation of a Y given that a V E F. It follows that if the sender and the receivers are rational, then for any partition of the interval >b @ into subintervals with cutoffs [ [ c c c [ . , whether it is an expressive equilibrium or not, we must have
Assuming a rational sender, therefore, this property holds for the expressive equilibria for every level of the cost of broadcasting. Now suppose that the sender is overconfident. Then for E ! , for example, the true expected value of a Y given that a V E is wE, but the sender assesses it to be equal to E ! wE. Moreover, if [ M is an interior cutoff point between messages M and M in a monotone strategy, it is possible that (
(That is, receivers' assessment upon receiving either message M or M is lower than the sender's assessment at the cutoff separating the subintervals where these two messages are sent.) Nevertheless, if broadcasting is costless, or if the cost of broadcasting is sufficiently small, this situation is not possible for cutoffs representing an expressive equilibrium partition. This follows because if
then with costless broadcasting a sender with V [ M strictly prefers to send message M over sending message M and he cannot therefore be indifferent between them as equilibrium requires.
Consider now the example of Figure 6 and assume that F . Then it can be shown that a symmetric expressive equilibrium of the model involves the sender remaining silent if V b and broadcasting (at a cost) message 1 if V b b and message 3 if V . The fact that ( 5 F in equilibrium is not a coincidence; indeed, it is necessary for an equilibrium in this and similar cases. To see this, note that if the sender's signal falls in the interval , then the sender is indifferent between incurring a cost of 0.4 to bring the receivers' assessments to 0.4 and remaining silent, in which case receivers' assessments are zero. Unlike our analysis so far, the indifference between broadcasting message 3 and remaining silent is not only a property of the cutoff point, but holds for the entire interval of sender types that broadcast this message, as well as for an interval of sender types who remain silent. (If V b then the sender strictly prefers to remain silent.) Similarly, sender types in the interval b b are indifferent between broadcasting message 1 at a cost of 0.4 or remaining silent. As the cost of broadcasting increases to w , the length of the interval of silent sender types expands until it captures the entire interval b . In the limit, broadcasting is done at most by the most extreme sender types (b and 1). Effectively, no information is transmitted. As in the rational case, when F ! w , the sender never broadcasts a costly message in equilibrium.
As stated in Proposition 4, when the sender is rational each expressive equilibrium is characterized by one long interval and . b short and equal-length intervals. The length of these intervals is the same in all the expressive equilibria. Thus, for example, one of the asymmetric equilibria when .
, w and F (the parameters used in Figures 4 and 5) has cutoff points and and another has cutoffs b and b . These cutoffs can be seen in Figure 7 . As the cost of broadcasting increases to w, the equilibrium becomes uninformative and no messages are broadcasted.
We show now that when the sender is overconfident, the asymmetric expressive equilibria can be very different from the corresponding (asymmetric) equilibria in the rational case. This is true especially when the cost of broadcasting is relatively high. Figure 7 describes an asymmetric expressive equilibrium for the same parameters as those in Figures 4 and 5 (. , w ) under the assumption that the sender is overconfident for various levels of cost. The sender types with the lowest signal realizations, represented by the grey area, are those that remain silent, while sender types in the short (and vanishing) interval immediately above the grey area broadcast message 2 and senders with highest signal realizations broadcast message 3.
To understand this figure, consider the cutoff points that define the silent region, i.e., such that sender types below them remain silent. When F F , each of these cutoff points is straddled by the receivers' assessments upon observing a silent sender and receivers' assessment upon observing broadcasted message 2. (That is, the equilibrium cutoff is larger than ( 5 Silent and smaller than ( 5 .) For F F F , the expressive equilibrium is characterized by the fact that the cutoff point separating silent types from those who broadcast message 2 is larger than receivers' assessments upon observing either of these messages. As we saw in the case of a symmetric equilibrium with an overconfident sender, in such equilibria there is an interval of sender types who are indifferent between broadcasting and remaining silent.
When F ! F , the interval of silent sender types "crowds out" the interval of those The exact values for F and F are given by F wbw bww and F ww b b w. These are derived as follows. Let [ and [ be the two cutoff points with [ [ . If the conditional expectations of pairs of adjacent messages straddle their common cutoff points, then [ and [ solve [ b wb [ w[ [ b [ F and [ b w[ [ F w [ b [ F. The critical value F is such that the solutions to these two equations also satisfy [ w[ [ (i.e., the value of the lower cutoff is equal to the assessment based on the second message). If [ ! w[ [ , then [ and [ must in equilibrium solve [ b wb [ [ b w[ [ F and [ b w[ [ F w [ b [ F. The critical value F is such that the solutions to these two equations also satisfies [ [ . sending message 2. In this region the cutoff points separating silent types from those sending message 2 coincides with the cutoff points separating the types that send message 2 from those who send message 3. Thus, for cost levels in this region there does not exist an expressive equilibrium in which three distinct assessments are made by receivers. Interestingly, while the interval of sender types that remain silent becomes larger, the interval of sender types that incur the cost and broadcast a message does not disappear as the cost increases to w. For example, if F , the equilibrium involves senders with V broadcasting a message at a cost, while all other sender types remain silent. Receivers make the assessment of b upon observing a silent sender, and assess the value of a Y to be if they observe a broadcasted message. More interestingly, unlike the cutoff points in the symmetric equilibrium, which converge to and b, the cutoff point here has an interior limit, and even as F approaches w information is communicated in equilibrium. Note that there is a discontinuity at F w, because for F ! w all sender types are silent.
It is arbitrary which message is actually broadcasted (and indeed it could be both available messages). What is important is that receivers make the same assessment upon observing a broadcasted message, namely . Note that this is not an expressive equilibrium as we have defined it (i.e., an equilibrium in which . distinct assessments are made by receivers).
To understand the difference between the symmetric and assymetric cases, first note that when a Y is uniformly distributed on >b @, then for every b D E F , the maximal difference between x b D E w c and x b E F w c is w. Note also that equilibrium with costly broadcasting requires that the difference between ( 5 Silent and ( 5 M, where M is a broadcasted message, must be at least F. To see this note that if messages are broadcasted, there must be a sender type that is indifferent between remaining silent and sending some message at a cost. Assume this type has V [ and is indifferent between broadcasting message M and remaining silent. Then M(
Finally, note that receivers' assessments given two non-adjacent messages are even further away from ( 5 silent than is ( 5 M. Now in the symmetric case ( 5 silent . Thus, the two messages adjacent to silence must lead to assessment whose absolute values are at least equal to F. As F approaches w, the intervals sending these messages must therefore collapse to the points and b, since the highest absolute magnitude of the conditional expectation of a Y occurs when V or V b and at these values it is equal to w. Note that in the symmetric case there are a total of at least three messages (silence and two messages on either side). Since silence types are located around zero, there need to be intervals on each side of the silent interval which lead to assessments with an absolute value of at least F. By contrast, in the asymmetric case, and for F close to w, there are effectively only two messages including silence, and the broadcast message is located only on one side of the silent interval. Note also that for any [ , the difference between x b b [ w c and x b [ w c is always w. Thus for
We now discuss the informativeness of the equilibria with costly broadcasting, i.e., the effectiveness of information transmission as measured by the mean squared error.
Recall that when broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, the unique expressive equilibrium, which involves equal length subintervals, is informationally efficient. This is no longer true when broadcasting is costly. First consider the case in which the sender is rational. Although for F w there are . expressive equilibria, all of which have the same mean squared error, these equilibria do not create equal-length subintervals and therefore are not informationally efficient. When F ! w, the equilibrium is silent and therefore completely uninformative.
Interestingly, when broadcasting is costly, overconfidence on the part of the sender can lead to more informative equilibria. Let us examine the informativeness of equilibria for the case .
and w , i.e., the example illustrated in Figures 5-7 . In Figure  8 we plot the mean squared error for different cost levels associated with (i) each of the expressive equilibria in the case of a rational sender (such as those shown in Figure  5 ), (ii) the symmetric equilibrium with an overconfident sender (as shown in Figure 6 ), and (iii) the asymmetric equilibria with an overconfident sender (such as that shown in Figure 7 ). First note that with an overconfident sender the mean squared errors obtained in the symmetric equilibria and those obtained in the asymmetric equilibria can be quite different. Second, we see that for relatively low levels of cost, the equilibria in the case of a rational sender are more informative than any of the equilibria when the sender is overconfident. However, when the cost is higher, the equilibria of the rational-sender case eventually become less informative than either equilibrium, symmetric or asymmetric, in the overconfident-sender case.
The relative informativeness of the equilibria when the sender is overconfident depends on the cost. Intuitively, the symmetric equilibrium is more informative for interme-F w, any partition of >b @ into two connected subintervals satisfies the condition that the absolute difference between ( 5 silent and ( 5 M where M is the broadcasted message is at least F. Suppose that ( 5 silent ( 5 M, and let [ be the cutoff point that separates the silent types from those who broadcast. Then we must have (
This means that as F goes to w, [ must approach wb [ (or, in the mirror image equilibrium, w [ ). For w , this will be at an interior point of >b @.
In comparing the mean squared errors associated with different outcomes, we implicitly ignore the costs incurred to broadcast messages. Our motivation for this is the notion that the total benefit of the information communicated by the sender is realized by a large number of receivers. Since the cost is only incurred by the sender, if the number of receivers is very large, then the cost is very small relative to the total benefit and can therefore be reasonably ignored. diate cost levels because overconfidence limits the growth of the middle (silent) interval, thereby creating a partition closer to the informationally efficient equal-length partition. However, when the cost grows further, the middle interval eventually grows fast, and eventually as F gets closer to w, the equilibrium becomes uninformative. By contrast, the asymmetric equilibrium remains informative even as F becomes close to w. We see here that when the sender is overconfident, although there does not exist an asymmetric expressive equilibrium for cost levels close to w, the (non-expressive) asymmetric equilibria more informative than the expressive (symmetric) equilibrium for these parameters. Thus, even though receivers only form two distinct assessments, more information is communicated in these equilibria than in the symmetric equilibria that might lead to three assessments. The reason is, of course, that messages are broadcasted with a very small probability in the symmetric equilibrium but with a significantly higher probability in the limit of the asymmetric equilibria.
The above discussion implies that if the sender is overconfident, then for .
there are three expressive equilibria for cost levels that are sufficiently small, and one expressive equilibrium when the cost is sufficiently close to (but lower than) w. More generally, for every ., as the cost increases, the number of expressive equilibria falls. The next result shows that in the limit as F converges to w from below, expressive equilibria exist only if . or . . Thus, if F is large enough, then even if . is large, there are at most two distinct beliefs that receivers can hold in equilibrium after observing the sender's action. The proof of this result shows that as F converges to w we cannot have two costly messages that lead to distinct receivers' assessment that are both "on the same side" of (i.e., both larger or both smaller than) receivers' assessments upon observing a silent sender. Thus, the equilibrium either involves the silent interval being in the center of the distribution and two costly messages sent by types at the two extremes of the distribution, or having a partition of only two intervals, one silent and one where a costly message is broadcasted. The first situation corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium for . (Figure 6 ) and the second corresponds to the limit of the asymmetric equilibrium in this case (Figure 7 ). It follows that if . ! and the cost of broadcasting is large enough, then some messages are either sent with zero probability or lead to the same assessments by receivers as others. This suggests that if broadcasting is costly increasing the number of available messages does not necessarily changes the number of messages effectively used in equilibrium. It is also consistent with the data presented in Figure 1. 
Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a simple model of information transmission in which a sender attempts to communicate his information to a population of receivers using a finite number of messages. Noise in this process arises from the possibility that the sender is actually uninformed. Assuming that receivers are always rational in interpreting the message they observe and that all underlying distributions are symmetric, our main results are as follows:
q If the sender is rational, there is an equilibrium outcome that is informationally effiNote that we have only analyzed the case of uniform distribution is this section. This highlights the issues that arise with costly broadcasting. If a Y has a different distribution, then some of the issues raised in the previous sections will also arise. cient in the sense that it minimizes the mean squared error of receivers' assessments over all the information transmission strategies available to the sender. This equilibrium need not be symmetric, and there are generally other equilibrium outcomes that are less informative. q If the sender is overconfident, equilibrium involves extreme messages being sent with a higher likelihood than other messages. The sender exaggerates in order to overcome the fact that receivers are discounting the informativeness of the message. Overconfidence generally reduces the number of equilibria, and this might actually lead to an improvement in the informativeness of the equilibrium by eliminating inefficient equilibria. q If broadcasting a message is costly to the sender, but the cost is not too high, then there are multiple equilibria distinguished by the set of sender types who remain silent. For a fixed cost of broadcasting, the equilibrium might be more informative if the sender is overconfident than if he is rational. Moreover, if the sender is overconfident, the equilibrium might be more informative when broadcasting is costly relative to the case of costless broadcasting.
We have motivated our analysis with a casual empirical observation, summarized in Figure 1 , concerning the distribution of the number of stars in book reviews on Amazon.com. As we noted, this figure shows that the distribution of the number of stars is highly non-uniform and asymmetric, and is characterized by a very high frequency of the extreme rating of five stars and by the fact that some other available ratings are essentially not used. Our analysis shows that all of these phenomena can arise in a simple model of information transmission in a noisy environment without relying on an asymmetric prior distribution. For example, we have shown that even with rational agents and symmetric underlying distributions, the equilibrium distributions of the broadcasted messages can be highly asymmetric. Moreover, with overconfident senders, equilibria in our model involve a relatively high likelihood of extreme messages being broadcasted. Finally, we have shown that if broadcasting is costly, then for some parameters equilibrium must essentially involve only a subset of available messages being utilized by the sender, leaving some available messages unsent. This said, it is quite clear that our model does not capture a number of the factors that might be relevant in fully explaining the pattern illustrated in Figure 1 . For example, our model is based on the implicit assumption that the sender is observing information about the value of a product selected at random from the entire distribution of possible values. Quite likely, however, readers choose books they are inclined to have a positive opinion of based on prior information. Thus, while the unconditional distribution of the value might be symmetric, the distribution of the value conditional on a review being made is likely to be skewed towards the relatively high value realizations.
More generally, the model analyzed here leaves numerous important issues and extensions for future research. Perhaps most importantly, our model is static and involves only one round of information transmission. The dynamic issues associated with information transmission on the internet are fascinating. For example, if information about a product or service is aggregated through many reviews over time, the timing choice of the sender, as well as the statistical properties of the stochastic process that describes the learning can be quite interesting. The arrival process of senders can itself be endogenized. If a product has received many poor reviews, the pool of potential reviewers might shrink because fewer agents will want to purchase the product and so less information-gathering will occur. Even with exogenous arrival process for senders, if broadcasting is costly there might be some selection of those senders who choose to broadcast messages later in the learning process relative to earlier in the process. Indeed, senders might be able to choose the timing of their broadcast strategically, in which case they might face a tradeoff between having more impact and free-riding on information of previous reviewers.
We have assumed throughout that receivers have rational expectations, i.e., that they always make the correct inference from the sender's actions. While this can be motivated through a learning story whereby receivers through experience learn how to interpret the sender's actions, it might be that in reality receivers make some consistent mistakes. This is especially true in a dynamic model, where receivers might not be fully aware of the stochastic process governing the arrival of senders and their strategies. For example, receivers might misestimate the cost to the sender of broadcasting a message and believe that all senders broadcast a message. In reality, however, if broadcasting is costly, the arrival process of reviewers might be censured in a way that only senders whose assessments are sufficiently far from receivers' current assessments incur the cost of broadcasting. This can also lead to a preponderance of extreme messages being observed, especially in reviews broadcasted relatively late in the process. This paper represents an attempt to capture through a simple model some of the issues that arise when broadcasting is relatively cheap and anonymous, and where at least some of those who provide information act altruistically. This has been motivated by the vast quantity of public broadcasting that occurs on the internet. As the comments above suggest, while our results may shed some light on certain phenomena, a large array of interesting issues remain to be investigated.
we are assuming the equilibrium is expressive, either
Since by assumption the sender chooses message L if his signal is V and chooses message M if his signal is V , it follows that (
5 M (where the second inequality follows from the monotonicity of ( 6 c). This and the fact that M(
shows that this cannot be an equilibrium. (The case where ( 5 L ! ( 5 M follows in the same manner.) To establish the second part of the lemma observe first that the forgoing shows that if message M is sent by a set of measure zero, that set must be a singleton. Assume therefore that message M is sent only if a V A V for some A V b . There must be intervals on either side of A V that send distinct messages. In other words, for V and V sufficiently close to A
and M are distinct indices. It is easy to show by the continuity of ( 
Proof of Proposition 1:
We first prove that informational efficiency can always be attained by a partition composed of connected sets. Consider any arbitrary partition of
First note that the partition will not be informationally efficient if some set in the partition has measure zero under the distribution ) Y. To see this assume that 3 Ua Y e L . There must be some M for which 3 Ua Y e M ! . Now consider the partition and e " N e N for N L M. It is clear that partition e " has strictly lower mean squared error than e. By the same sort of argument one can show that a partition will not be informationally efficient if for some L and M, x L x M A
x. In this case we obtain a strictly better partition by letting In some special cases one can have an expressive equilibrium where a particular message is sent only if V is equal to one of the extreme values (1 or -1). This can occur only if the sender's expectation of Y conditional on V equaling one of these extreme values is much closer to zero than the receiver's expectation conditional on the same information. This case will not arise in our analysis. . Now observe that the mean squared error (MSE) under partition e is MSE of e
Thus for any arbitrary partition there is a partition to connected sets that whose mean squared error is not greater. Note further that if in the construction above x " L x L for some L, the partition e is strictly dominated by a partition of connected sets. Now assume that we have a partition of connected sets and let bV be the partition that includes V. In other words, bV
., where [ b and [ . (As we have done throughout the paper, we do not explicitly specify to which set points on the boundary belong since any assignment has no effect on the results.) Consider first the case where the a V a Y, i.e., the signal is informative. Let MSE informed be the mean squared error conditional on a V a Y. We have 
[ b and [ . . Now observe that a fixed point of the mapping w7 6 6 gives the boundary points of an equilibrium partition when the sender is overconfident and the probability that he is informed is w. Since w7 is continuous and 6 is a compact, convex subset of 5
. , we know that w7 has at least one fixed point. (It is easy to show that any fixed point must be in the interior of 6 and therefore will define an expressive equilibrium.) We will prove the proposition by showing that for w sufficiently small, w7 is a contraction mapping. To do this we will show that there exists m such that 
Proof of Proposition 4:
First, it is easy to see that if F ! w, then there does not exist an equilibrium in which any message is broadcast. In this case the benefit of communicating information is bounded above by w (because the largest possible difference between an assessment based on V being in a particular subinterval of >b @ and the assessment of V being in any adjoining subinterval is equal to w), so the cost is always larger than the benefit. Thus, it cannot be worthwhile for a sender to broadcast a message at a cost larger than w. Now assume that F w. Let / 6 be the length of the interval of realizations for which the sender remains silent. There will be at least one interval adjoining this "silent interval" that gives the set of realizations of V for which one of the . b messages is broadcast. Let this interval have length / % . Then for the sender who receives the realization of V at the boundary between these two intervals to be indifferent it must be the case that w/ 6 w/ % F $ This follows because the prediction error occurring when the sender with V equal to the boundary point remains silent is w/ 6 , while the prediction error occurring when the costly message is sent is w/ % . It is easy to show that all the intervals associated with costly messages must be the same length. This means that / 6 . b / % . This together with (A15) establishes the result. This is the same condition on F as obtained in the prior case so we know that F must be again be smaller than or equal to w w w. We have assumed that the two costly messages have expectations above ( 5 Silent. It is clear that the case where the two costly messages have expectations below ( 5 Silent is the mirror image of this and produces the same result.
Proof of Proposition

